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Abstract
Regional development takes place in a complex force field, in which com-
petitiveness is playing an increasingly important role. At present, we observe a re-
positioning of regions in an open European space. Vanishing borders will automatically
mean an increase of competition between European regions. The driving forces behind
such competition are strongly related with the presence of R & D centres and network
links with other regions.
The paper addresses the fundamentals of modern regional policy and calls in
particular for due attention for the critical role of infrastructure networks in the European
unification process.. The changing role of governments in this context is also highlighted.
The paper focuses on particular in Central and Eastern European regions and discusses in
detail the opportunities offered by foreign direct investments.
1 . Regional Development Questions
It is widely accepted that traditional forms of regional policy intervention have not
been very successful. Rather than a reduction in intensity of regional policy, most
countries have in recent years shown a reorientation of regional policy. This reorientation
found its roots in modern (mainly neo-Schumpeterian) views on economic growth, with a
strong emphasis on both competitive behaviour (rather than government protection) and
innovative behaviour of all regions and promising sectors. As a consequence, the
foundations for economic growth, i.e. technology policy and infrastructure policy, have
become the focus of regional policy, in the framework of an ecologically sustainable
regional economic development (Nijkamp,  1996).
The intensity and orientation of regional policy in most countries is strongly
influenced by external conditions, as can easily be demonstrated for the case of regional
development in Europe. Until the end of the seventies, regional policy was a recognized
and respected part of economic policy, focusing its attention on both the enhancement of
economic efficiency (by favouring direct productive activities) and the reduction of
undesirable interregional discrepancies (e.g., by subsidizing social overhead capital in
lagging areas) (see also Hirschman, 1965). In the period of the economic stagnation in
Europe - the first half of the eighties - the policy interest shifted more to economic
restructuring, to be induced by favouring competitive behaviour (rather than by protecting
weaker parts of the economy). Reaganomics  and Thatcherianism were typical illustrations
of the policy view that direct government intervention would in the long run be
detrimental to the economy as a whole. Beside a dramatic reduction in funds spent directly
as subsidies for weaker branches of the regional economy, the rapidly emerging budget
deficits forced governments also to reduce their expenditures for new infrastructures, one
of the traditional means of regional policy.
Only in recent years the bleak perspective of regional policies has improved in
various European countries. The reasons for the revival of regional policy are twofold.
First, it has been realized that regions are the ‘workfloor’ of economic activity and that -
in order to be competitive - regions should focus much more strongly on economic
restructuring generated by technological innovation (which means essentially an
integration of regional policy and technology policy). Secondly, from a European
perspective, the completion of the internal market and the recent shift towards Eastern
Europe may endanger a rapid economic progress, if at the same time the intra-European
discrepancies at regional levels become too large. In order to avoid a situation that in the
nineties the fruits of economic development cannot be reaped because of extremely large
interregional economic discrepancies, a more intensified tailor-made regional policy effort
became necessary (focusing in particular on infrastructure and technology).
How can regional development initiatives be reinforced and how can the necessary
critical mass of mature regional development programmes be created, if a region is still
hampered by various structural bottlenecks? In general terms, one may argue that a
drastic improvement of the region’s comparative advantage is a sine qua non. This
implies in particular:
a there have to be sufficient locational advantages in terms of inexpensive (both skilled
and unskilled) labour and low real estate prices
l private sector initiatives have to be supported by ‘good governance’, i.e. non-bureau-
cratic, flexible and efficient policy and management procedures (e.g., quick approval
l procedures, efIicient  customs procedures, sufficient supply of public services etc.)
l the region as a whole has to develop a sense of Schumpeterian entrepreneurschip
where new initiatives are welcomed and where the public sector offers support
mechanisms for private sector developments
l the lack of accessibility and connectivity has to be remedied by developing a consistent
new infrastructure policy over a long-range period which serves to alleviate the dis-
advantages originating from the peripheral character of problem regions.
In the next section we will address more in particualr the issues of efficiency and
equity against the background of regional competitiveness.
2. Effkiency,  Equity and Competitiveness
Regions - just as nations - offer a remarkable spectrum of development. Many
regions may be seen as problem cases, but it is noteworthy that ‘the regional problem’ is
not an unambiguous concept. Regions may face problem situations (such as high
unemployment rates, high (or low) population densities, low education, inferior
infrastructure, poor environmental conditions etc.) and many of these problem situations
are directly or indirectly related to regional welfare levels (or lack of growth therein).
Seen from this perspective, regions do not differ from nations: nations also exhibit
persistent disparities in GDP per capita. But there is a basic difference with respect to
regions: a system of regions is much more an open trade system without customs’ or
institutional barriers. Thus, competitiveness plays a crucial role in regional development.
This is once more important, as also factor mobility tends to be much higher between
regions, especially for the higher skilled labour market segments.
Competitiveness may be seen as a vehicle to cope with the ‘regional problem’. It
should be added that interregional competitiveness has a clear spatial (geographical)
dimension, as firms (or even entire regions) in a competitive environment may address
different geographical markets, ranging from local to global. Of course, this depends
largely on the type of product and the industrial organisation of the sector concerned.
In a static competitive market there will always be winners and losers, but it is
important to recognise the difference between absolute and relative winners (or losers).
This is undoubtedly important in a regional economy, as it often happens that a region is
growing in absolute sense (e.g., in GDP per capita), while it is losing on its market share
(in relative terms). This may widen the welfare gaps between various regions, thus
aggravating the equity problem among regions.
The basic question then is whether after an initial period of growing interregional
disparities in the longer run a process of spatial-economic convergence will start. This
means that the regional question does not only refer to a static allocation problem, but also
to a dynamic long-range qualitative conversion phenomenon.
Since regions are more sensitive to comparative advantages and competitive
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strategies of various players, they display also more severe fluctuations in income and
employment. Following Keynesian recipes, regions tend to generate a relatively high
output growth, if they are involved in export activities. But there are also other factors
which lie at the heart of the existence of regional disparities. This may be understood by
referring to the well-known efficiency-equity dilemma. A region which is lagging behind
may have an improper use of factor inputs which prohibits the achievement of a maximum
output growth. This means that a first goal of regional development would have to be an
optimum allocation of input with a view on a maximum contribution to regional
production. This efficiency goal is often contradicted by another policy consideration, viz.
equity. Regions do not grow to the same extent, with the consequence that regional
disparities emerge. Some of such disparities may be temporary in nature (e.g., due to
market adjustments), but others are more persistent and may exhibit a robust pattern over
many generations. From a policy perspective, this provokes the need to mitigate such
inter-regional welfare differences, but it is clear that the goal of a reduction of welfare
discrepancies is usually - and certainly in the short run - at odds with the goal of a
maximum contribution of each region to overall output. This has also provoked the
question whether huge sums of public financial support would have to be given to ‘lost
cases’, and whether the money should not have been spent otherwise.
The efficiency-equity dilemma has generated a world-wide debate on the question
of convergence in the medium or long run. Based on a simple neo-classical growth model,
it can easily be demonstrated that convergence between regions in terms of output per
capita will arise as a result of declining output of capital, a phenomenon which may be
ascribed to declining revenues of capital accumulation. This situation would mean that in
the long run the ‘forerunners’ will lose their comparative advantage and the ‘backrunners’
will sooner or later catch up their delay. In the economics literature the convergence
theory has extensively been discussed; it has led to adjusted concepts such as absolute
versus conditional convergence, or beta convergence versus delta convergence.
The empirical facts on convergence are not conclusive. There are several empirical
cases where within a country convergence has occurred, but there are also cases where
persistent welfare differences continue to exist. For instance, in the EU 15 the maximum
difference in terms of GDP per head amounts to an approx. a factor 6.
In recent publications on regional growth differences, much attention has been
given to the effects of globalisation which position regions in an international force field
with many opportunities, but also with many problematic outcomes for vulnerable regional
economies and cities (see also Nijkamp and Poot, 1998).
Scientists with an optimistic perspective on globalization  (usually economists) have
pointed out to several other positive features, in addition to an avalanche of product and
process innovations plus the lower costs of communication and transportation. One of the
most important is that the growth in international trade does not only lead to an enhanced
economic welfare from countries being able to exploit comparative advantage, but the
efficiency gains from economic integration may also fuel technological progress and scale
economies which in certain circumstances may lead to permanently higher global growth
rates.
Recently, it has also been recognized  that the increasing fluidity of innovation
diffusion  and absorption contributes to the convergence of living standards between
regions or countries which share common technologies and this convergence is reinforced
through trade and factor mobility. Convergence is in the standard neo-classical growth
models due to diminishing returns to capital accumulation, but evidence is now emerging
that trade can also contribute to the catching up of the lagging regions and countries. Thus
open economies have a fair chance to be on a converging pace.
In addition, an increased openness forces governments to carry out prudent fiscal
and monetary policies and, for example, to maintain low rates of inflation. That the
discipline of the international marketplace reduces the degrees of freedom in economic
policy is clear, for example, from the political difficulties surrounding the introduction of
the European Monetary Union (EMU). Finally, rather than being a threat, rising incomes
in huge emerging economies such as China and India open up vast export opportunities
for the developed world, and vice versa.
In contrast to growth optimism, there is also an emerging school of thought which
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emphasises the costs of globalization. Its proponents are found primarily among
protectionists, politicians and adversely affected sectors. One of the most often quoted
problems is globalization-induced structural change. Globalization may have accelerated
the sectoral composition of the economy in a way which has led to large adjustment costs
both for capital and labour. In the developed economies these have often taken the form of
a decline in manufacturing. This process is commonly referred to as deindustrialization or
hollowization. Not only are resources withdrawn from declining industries, but they are
increasingly taken abroad to reap higher rates of return to capital. The effects of
globalization on the service sectors are not unambiguously positive either, as for example
the Internet may substitute for local intermediaries such as real estate agents or travel
agents.
Moreover, the speed of change is faster than ever before which has led, due to
limited substitution elasticities between different types of occupations and the time-
intensive processes of upskilling and retraining, to growing unemployment. Restructuring
has led to growing wage premiums for highly skilled internationally mobile people in
professional and managerial occupations, while it has marginalised blue collar employment
in traditional industries. There is therefore little dispute that globalization has led to
growing income inequality, despite the national welfare gains.
Another strand of literature warns that increasing returns in information related
industries may lead to a monopolisation of large enterprises in certain areas (e.g.,
Microsoft in the software industry) or the widespread adoption of sub-optimal
technologies due to network externalities. An opposite force is the re-emergence of the
small firm as falling communication costs permit specialization, niche marketing and
outsourcing. The global trend in the growth of small firms encourages competitiveness and
innovation. The two forces of market concentration and dispersion operate at the same
time and lead to a growing complexity and diversity of global market structures.
Finally, globalization has also contributed to the growing severity of global
environmental problems as the increasing global output, trade, mobility and real incomes
have led to unsustainable exploitation of natural resources such as tropical forests, the
accelerated emission of greenhouse gases and the irreversible damage to the ecosystem.
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The strategic question now is how the regions of the world are faring under these
far-reaching global changes. It is hard to find regional islands of stability amidst the global
turbulence. Some regions (e.g., California, Ile-de-France, Bavaria, Randstad Holland)
have become “world regions” with a far reaching impact on the world economy as a
whole. Others have become important specialised areas providing services or
manufacturing to a significant part of our world (e.g., Third Italy, the Greater London
area, Silicon Valley, Tokyo Metropolitan area). And yet others have become the losers in
the new competitive world economy (e.g., regions in Central and Eastern Europe, Greece,
parts of Latin America). And finally, there are also peripheral regions, which due to
historical or ecological advantages are booming as a result of global tourism flows (e.g.,
the Creek islands and the Turkish coast, the Caribbean, northern Queensland). Virtually all
regions in the world seem to be in a state of transition as a result of global forces
(economic, geopolitical, cultural, demographic).
It seems that world-wide there is a tendency that ‘clubs’ of regions are emerging,
so that a convergence to one of these clubs seems to take place, which would eventually
lead to a fragmented regional convergence.
Although the exact nature of this global change cannot as yet be easily and
precisely mapped out, there is no doubt that development prospects, uncertainties and
interdependencies of regions are key features. Research into the major issues, challenges
and problems of the regions has only recently commenced. The regional configuration in
the age of globalization appears to turn into a multi-polar spatial system, in a partly
fragmented way (following the end of the cold war) and in a partly uniform way
(following the diminishing of the North-South conflict). The global picture of the regions
is rather heterogeneous (cf. also Masser et al., 1992).
A final remark is still in order here. Besides the well-known efficiency-equity
dilemma and the issue of regional convergence, there is also the need for regional
sustainable development (in terms of environmental quality, safety and security). The goal
of regional sustainable development may be at odds with the goals of efficiency and
equity, which once more may restrict the degrees of freedom of a regional development
policy. On the other hand, the goal of regional environmental sustainability may be
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supportive with respect to efficiency and equity, e.g. in areas with a high environmental
quality which may reap the fruits of tourism or cultural visits.
3. Regional Diagnoses and Remedies
The awareness of the ‘regional problem’ - in some form or another - has created an
avalanche of literature on causes and remedies. It was soon recognized  that - if the
convergence trajectory would not ‘automatically’ be followed from a neo-classical
perspective - an active policy intervention might be necessary. A major question then was
whether this policy support would have to take the form of income transfer (e.g.,
subsidies, fiscal mechanisms) or whether a fine-tuned overhead policy (e.g., education,
infrastructure, innovation) would have to be induced. Clearly, the regional development
problem has led to a fundamental debate on the role of governments in regional-economic
policy.
The influence of public policy on the society and the regional and national
economy has drastically increased since 1945. As a result government expenditures have
significantly risen (absolutely and relatively), while also much more regulatory measures
have been introduced. Social security systems were, for example, largely expanded, while
the government assumed inter alia responsibility for the financing and operation of
transport infrastructure.
In the 1980s however, the societal and institutional environment in which
economic agents were used to act has changed dramatically. This holds for the public as
well as the private sector: the devolution movement has induced an increased competition
between companies and countries. As a result, a rising need for restructuring and renewal
has come to the fore, and hence the Schumpeterian paradigm of ‘creative destruction’ has
gained popularity (cf. Kamann and Nijkamp, 1991). Even large companies like IBM and
Philips appear to face problems when lags in renewal cause structural inefficiencies. The
same may hold for countries and regions: the economic development of most Western-
European countries and regions, for example, lags behind that of the US and the Pacific,
which may be due to a more regulatory and conservative institutional environment in
Europe.
The new institutional model which has arisen is a blend of competition and
cooperation between actors or stakeholders. The connecting constellation is mostly made
up by network configurations, with key players in the nodes of such a network. It is
increasingly recognised that a network model may be an efficient tool for competition and
strategic policy.
These trends apply to both the private and the public sector. World-wide, we
observe much more cooperation between countries and between trade blocks (EU,
NAFTA, ASEAN),  while unnecessary regulations are abolished (labour market, capital
market). It has become clear that a good management in the public as well as the private
sector may be of increasing importance for the economic development and welfare of
countries, regions and their citizens. Thus, institutional reform seeking to enhance the
efficiency of public (regional) authorities seems to be inevitable.
Despite a lack of overwhelming success, there are several standard reasons for
governments to intervene in the market. They are well documented in the literature and
will only briefly be summarised here.
First, there is the ‘infant industry’ and ‘infant region’ argument. Here, it can be
argued that in an initial stage of industrial or regional development the economic basis of a
sector or region is too weak to be competitive and to survive, and therefore economic
actors should be protected temporarily. In practice however, it appears that these
measures are very hard to abolish, while these may lead to inefficiency and a Pareto-
suboptimal allocation. Therefore, there is nowadays more a trend to establish an attractive
general business climate, while - at least in Europe - protection also is decreased by
European legislation. Another argument is that in recent decades the accessibility of
peripheral regions has increased substantially by constructing new infrastructure which
reduces the validity of the ‘infant region’ argument.
Nevertheless, in case of structural peripherality a system of special Economic
Zones may be envisaged, but it remains to be seen whether firms attracted to a few
selective Special Economic Zones will remain there, after the privileges (e.g., tax
exemption) will be abandoned.
Second, market failures may occur because a market system does not always result
in a Pareto-optimal allocation. The aim of government intervention is then to remedy this
sub-optimal allocation and in this way to move towards the theoretically optimal situation
of perfect competition. There are several causes of such market failures.
0 imperfect competition; infrastructure is an example of this situation, because it is in
most cases not efficient to operate two links on the same corridor. Also the special
network character of infrastructure causes imperfect competition: one given link may
contribute to the profitability of other links, and therefore an unprofitable link may be
profitable when the impact on the total network is taken into account. Often however,
there is competition with other transport modes (while for highways also a high quality
underlying road network is available), which reduces the importance of this argument.
0 imperfect information; this seems (besides telematics systems) to be of lesser
importance in the case of infrastructure but, in general, less developed and peripheral
areas appear to have less access to strategic market information. Thus, improvement
of telecommunication services to remote areas seems to be a condition sine qua non
for regional development policy.
0 absence of markets; governments intervene in transport to eliminate negative
externalities or to generate positive externalities as discussed above. In environmental
and transport policy however, there is a trend to cope with negative externalities in a
more market based way, e.g., by increasing me1 costs and introducing tools or road-
pricing systems. Such measures might also be carried out by private instead of public
companies however, since there is in principle a direct user charge for the operator of
the infrastructure.
Finally, there is the ethics and justice argument; an obvious example is the
provision of non-profitable public transport to isolated places, because the government
wants to provide a minimum mobility level for everyone at reasonable costs. In this
context, there is world-wide again a clear trend towards a market based provision, e.g., by
using franchising contracts in order to link social policies to efficiency incentives.
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4 . The Critical Role of Infrastructure
The main aim of regional policy is to improve the regional production structure
and the regional production environment (‘milieu’) so as to upgrade the regional
performance (by making the region more competitive). The market position and the
competitive position of a regional are a result of the ratio of relative output prices vis-a-vis
relative factor prices. By improving regional infrastructure this ratio may become more
favourable, so that the relative strength of the region is increased and more activities are
attracted towards the region. This means that infrastructure conditions have especially an
impact via dynamic reallocation effects (see also the Willamson (1975) hypothesis).
In recent years a clear increase in the interest in infrastructure as an engine behind
economic development can be observed (Nijkamp, 1993, 1995). The reasons for the new
focus on infrastructure are manifold, but at least four motives of paramount importance
can be identified.
First, there is the recognition that the process of economic and technological
restructuring will be hampered, if the design and implementation of new infrastructure will
not keep pace with the needs of a growing economy. There is a growing fear that ‘missing
links’ or even ‘missing networks’ will have a negative influence on the competitive
position of Europe (cf. Nijkamp et al., 1994).
In the second place, the emergence and implementation of new transport,
communication and information infrastructure has to be mentioned. Especially telematics
offers an enormous potential, but it is not yet Miy  utilized (mainly because of problems of
compatibility and org ware).
Next, there is the growing awareness that the European integration will
increasingly move toward a network economy in which the nodes (i.e., metropolitan areas)
will play a key role in a European spatial interaction system, where interactions (material
and non-material) will take place along main corridors (cf. Bithas  and Nijkamp, 1997).
And finally, in many countries a new emphasis on infrastructure investments can be
observed because of the presupposed causal link between these investments and their
employment generating potential. In the latter framework infrastructure becomes an
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instrument for socio-economic purposes. This renewed interest becomes once more
manifest because of the significant reduction in public expenditures in infrastructure
construction and maintenance.
Despite the commonly accepted positive role of infrastructure in regional
development processes, it ought to be recognized that the empirical evidence is not always
unambiguous. This is partly caused by the lack of measurable, generally accepted
indicators (e.g., how do we measure regional development, or how do we define in
operational terms infrastructure). Seen from an infrastructural  perspective, it is noteworthy
that infrastructure is not a single commodity, but rather a portfolio of functional services
offered to the region. The nature of these services and their impact depends largely on the
absorption capacity of the region and on the needs composition of the region concerned.
This makes a clear-cut empirical proof rather problematic. Furthermore, there are
significant differences in terms of the time span of infrastructure investments (see for
details also Rietveld and Nijkamp 1993).
It should also be added that infrastructure does not only have a function as a
material, physical basis for enhancing regional welfare. It is increasingly recognized that
infrastructure has also a role as a contributor to international knowledge transfer, to
access to innovative activities elsewhere and to R&D in other regions. This innovative
capacity of infrastructure has been convincingly demonstrated in recent studies by Suarez-
Villa (1993, 1996). His basic argument rests on the remarkable association between
education infrastructure construction (interpreted in a broad sense) and corporate
innovative capacity. It seems plausible that the connecting function of infrastructure as a
network capital is also playing a crucial role in the spatial pattern of foreign direct
investments.
Clearly, it has to be admitted that the interest in transport infrastructure also
shows a cyclical pattern, and some authors argue even that transport infrastructure is
exhibiting a megacycle. For instance, Andersson and Stromquist (1988) claim that histo-
rically major transitions in the European economic system were always accompanied (or
even induced) by major changes in transport and communications infrastructures. These
authors distinguish even four main transport and logistic revolutions in the history of
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Western Europe, each of them characterized  by the emergence, adoption and
implementation of a new basic type of infrastructure.
Insufficiently functioning infrastructure means missing economic development and
as a result a loss of economic potential. On the other hand, reliable and modern transport
and communication systems provide a stimulus for economic development. Bottlenecks in
these systems in the form of either missing links or missing networks - be it unimodal or
multimodal - cause economic inefficiencies. It is therefore no surprise that a very large
share of the European Fund for Regional Development is spent on infrastructure; it is
expected that such investments would upgrade regional economics in backward areas.
There is no doubt that attempts at improving the physical network infrastructure
(such as rail-, motor-, air-, and waterway or telecommunication networks) are not
sufficient to overcome the - sometimes much more dividing - non-physical barriers
between countries and regions such as language or cultural barriers based on tradition or
historical heritage. In particular, the unification of Germany and the recent opening of the
borders to eastern Europe have demonstrated that bridging these non-physical gaps may
take much longer than the re-integration of transport and communication networks, even
though this alone may require decades. Thus there is apparently a tension field between
potentiality and bottlenecks in the European restructuring process (cf. also Nijkamp and
Van Geenhuizen, 1997; Button and Nijkamp, 1997).
Clearly, a European construction of a network economy does not materialize
automatically, but requires dedicated efforts from both the public and the private sector.
Substantial capital investment is required to construct a high quality network and difficult
decisions have to be made if the European dimension is considered as important as the
national concerns. Traditionally, most transport infrastructure investment has been carried
out by national governments in the public sector, and it is only in the communications
sector that the possibility of private capital has been explored. New European agencies
(e.g. EBRD and EIB) have been set up to adjudicate on new investments, and possibilities
are also being considered of joint venture projects between the private and the public
sector. In the operations of transport and communications markets, many European
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countries have had different traditions, some based on strong central intervention and
others allowing much greater market freedom.
As mentioned above, in the context of regulatory policy on networks the role of
governments is of utmost importance. Most decisions on European networks are taken by
national governments through well established procedures. As transnational European
networks evolve, many decisions will have to be taken by international agencies. This
requires that new institutional, organisational and legal frameworks be established. The
roles of the different political, legal, financial and planning agencies will have to be
resolved, together with an understanding of how decisions are taken.
The question is, however, whether new infrastructures lead to significant effects at
the regional level. This is the subject matter of infrastructure impact analysis. Infrastruc-
ture impact analysis is a specific form of spatial impact analysis (cf. Nijkamp and Blaas,
1994) and serves to assess the foreseeable effects (in the ex ante case) or the realized
effects (in the ex post case) of investments in infrastructure. Various methods have been
designed and used in the context of infrastructure impact analysis.
Input-output analysis is one of the conventional techniques used to estimate the
direct and indirect employment effects of infrastructure investments. It turns out that
especially the assessment of programme effects is usually problematic. The estimation of
the size of spillover effects of infrastructure investments has always been a focal point of
attention in regional, development and transportation economics. Especially in regional
economic development theories, transport infrastructure has always played a prominent
role, mainly because of the potential of such infrastructure for generating new growth
impulses.
Beside input-output analysis and regional development theory, also location
theories have often focused attention on the role of infrastructure, by providing a micro-
economic foundation for the behaviour of firms in view of accessibility conditions. These
theories were normally based on the view that accessible locations brought about cost
advantages to individual firms (mainly savings in transport costs), so that infrastructure is
one of the decision parameters of the firm.
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Some of these micro-based considerations have also been translated into a macro-
based framework, for instance, by Tinbergen (1957) who tried to investigate the
programme effects of infrastructural  investments. In the model developed by Tinbergen a
major role is played by the improvement of infrastructure as a key factor for the
improvement of market positions of firms. This model can briefly be described as
follows. The demand for goods is dependent on the income generated by its production. It
is evident that improvements in infrastructure lead to a reduction in transport costs of the
commodities produced by the firms concerned. As a result, a shift in the relative prices of
these commodities will take place generating a multiplier effect, because the shift in
demand towards cheaper goods leads to a rise in discretionary income. This extra
spending capacity will then lead to a rise in demand for new goods, which generates in
turn additional employment, etc.
According to Tinbergen, the multiplier effects of such programmes are higher than
the direct and indirect employment effects of infrastructure. Clearly, some remarks
concerning this model are in order. For instance, the model neglects the fact that
consumers might save their extra discretionary income (rather than spending it), while also
the possibility that firms (especially in a non-competitive market) might take a higher
profit margin (rather than reducing the commodity prices) is assumed away. Furthermore,
the favourable results may be reduced by the phenomenon of leakage effects in
international (or interregional) trade. Nevertheless, this approach is interesting and
valuable, as it calls attention for higher-order effects that may emerge in other sectors
than the transport sector and its directly related sectors.
Although infrastructure investments are of critical importance for regional
development, they are by no means sufficient conditions for generating regional
development effects. In this context various caveats (see Nijkamp and Blaas, 1994) have
to be mentioned.
l The effectts of new elements of infrastructures on regional development differ more as
these elements are more unique.
l The effects are higher as a clear regional potential is more present; otherwise, even
negative effects may result.
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The effects are co-determined by the size of the infrastructure project concerned.
The effects are higher as the design of new infrastructure is oriented towards the
generation of synergetic effects with existing infrastructure (an ‘infrastructure
complex’).
The effects are higher as a given region is improving its infrastructure significantly
more than other regions.
The effects are also dependent on the overall economic situation.
The effects are more favourable as infrastructure policy and technology policy are
coordinated.
The effects of new infrastructure are also dependent on the development phase of a
region.
The effects of most large-scale infrastructure investments are usually irreversible, so
that such decisions are to be based on a risk strategy.
Finally, significant positive effects of new infrastructure can never be guaranteed, as
infrastructure is only a necessary - and not a sufficient - condition for regional
economic development.
The previous remarks illustrate that a simple measurement scheme for assessing
the impacts of infrastructure policy on regional development is far from easy. However, a
policy based on synergetic effects via an ‘infrastructure complex’ strategy is likely to
generate the highest benefits.
infrastructure development.
5. Regional Development Strategies
Regional development strategies are of a multi-faceted nature. There is not a single
and simple recipe. We will discuss here three strategic levels for enhancing regional
competitiveness, viz. the economic geography, the industrial development and the micro
(firm) behaviour (Van Geenhuizen and Nijkamp, 1998).
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5 . 1 Economic geography
In the history of regional development policy several approaches have been
advocated to increase regional efficiency and at the same time to reduce inter-regional
disparities. The growth pole concept, for instance, has been an established policy concept
in the seventies. Although this notion as a policy orientation has faded away, it has re-
emerged under different names such as technopoles, innovation centres, technology
districts, islands of innovation etc. The basic idea is that not all regions can be at the same
time a subject of public policy, as this would be too costly and would not create a
sufficiently large critical mass. Thus, selectivity is a sine qua non for an efficient regional
development policy. Although some successes are certainly found, it turned out that the
scale and critical mass of such initiatives was in many cases insufficient.
In the recent past, an interest has emerged in spatial economic corridors (e.g,  the
Blue Banana stretching from London via Holland and the Ruhr Area and Paris to Baden-
Wurttemberg  and North Italy and mapping out the Western European economic force
field). For the Central European case, in the past a so-called ‘boomerang area’ (connecting
Northern Poland and Warsaw with Prague and Budapest in a boomerang shape) has been
proposed, but it seems more logical to think of a ‘golden triangle’ in which also Berlin,
Dresden and Leipzig might be included in this Central European development zone.
Clearly, such geographical maps are imaginative and provoke political debate and action,
as they reinforce the socio-economic and geographical image of an area in connection with
adjacent (cooperative and competitive) areas (cf. Hall, 1993).
In the same spirit, we also witness an increasing interest in spatial-economic
networks of a trans-national nature (e.g., Euregions), which are also meant to maximise
the benefits through cooperation of competing regions.
5.2 Industrial development
In more recent years, much attention has been focused on regional self-reliance, on
a much more active and self-conscious involvement of the region and all its (private and
public) actors. Competitiveness is then not regarded as the result of a top-down support,
but is preponderantly contingent upon the creativeness of the regional base. This has led to
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the idea that the regional (or local) milieu is a critical success factor for any regional
development policy. Business climate is not something which can be imposed upon the
region, but is a spin-off of the existing entrepreneurial spirits in the region. Clearly, such
entrepreneurial conditions are certainly more likely to exist in larger agglomerations, but
they may also be the result of creative entrepreneurship in even isolated areas (cf. e.g.,
Lego in Billund or the Swatch industry in the Jura). Another, increasingly important factor
is the industrial organisation in a region, in particular the network configuration between
industries mutually and the linkages with the public sector. This may lead to new clusters
of regional innovation, following also Porter’s diamond approach where communication
channels, personal relationships geographical proximity, and local ties are seen as
necessary conditions for regional development.
In addition to policies based on the indigenous strength of the region, there is also
the need to attract foreign capital. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI’s) are often seen as
the miraculous vehicles for accelerated regional development. Necessary as they may be, it
ought to be recognized  that the interest of FDI’s  is in general not in the regional
development as such, but in the exploitation of the region’s comparative advantage for the
company itself (see also Section 6).
More recently, we have also witnessed successful industrial policies focused on
the creation of regional industrial networks (so-called ‘filieres’), sometimes also with the
assistance of foreign participation. The success story of the Third Italy is a good example
of this.
5.3 Micro (firm) behaviour
Regional development is often a matter of small and medium-sized enterprises
(WE’s),  of small-scale initiatives, but if they occur in large numbers they may add
significantly to regional growth. Thus, the nurturing of existing (incumbent) business life
and the creation of favourable incubation conditions for new business initiations is an
important regional development task.
Clearly, the attraction of multinational, large-scale firms is an interesting option,
but may make the region also vulnerable, as such companies do often exhibit ‘nomadic’
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behaviour. This would mean that regional policy would have to address both SME’s  and
multinational activities.
The response of successful companies to the challenge in regional policy may be
diverse:
l an increasing emphasis on scaling up by fusion and take-overs (e.g., in the financial
sector);
l an aggressive market penetration (e.g., consumer electronics);
0 ‘back to basics’ strategies with repulsion of other activities (e.g., car industry, micro-
electronics);
l emphasis on quality and flexibility (just in time principles, temporary contracts for
employees);
l developing national and international strategic alliances, in order to secure the
competitive position (car industry, chemical sector).
Thus, it is clear that - in addition to conventional roles of regional policy
addressing overhead investments (e.g., in the education sector or in infrastructure) -
indigenous regional entrepreneurial and administrative skills are necessary to put the
region on an accelerated growth path. Networking will then turn out to be a critical factor
for business attitude, while the region as a whole would have to build on information and
communication infrastructure which would encourage the region to abandon inertia and to
become a learning region in a Schumpeterian sense. This would also be of critical
importance for the attraction of foreign capital to the area. This is the subject of the next
section.
6. Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment may be defined as the transfer by a firm of capital (and
other resources) into a foreign business venture, aimed at acquiring control of the venture
(see also Van Geenhuizen, 1998). FDI may take the form of a joint venture, acquisition
and establishment of an entirely new venture (greenfield investment). We will address
here in particular FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, as this is the most dominant form of
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regional development stimuli in this area. In fact, FDI in Central and Eastern Europe
tends to take most often the form of a joint venture, either with a domestic company or
with an acquisition of such a company (about 50%). This pattern reflects a certain risk-
avoiding behaviour.
FDI can be measured in different ways, with slightly different underlying
conceptualizations.  Accordingly, countries make different statistics available, such as
based on the cumulative foreign component of foreign investment enterprises and the
cumulative balance-of-payments FDI inflows.
Many lagging regions see nowadays a great potential in the attraction of foreign
capital to their area. This may undoubtedly generate various benefits to the region, but it
has also various potential disadvantages. FDI’s are sometimes exhibiting unpredictable
fluctuations due to changes in foreign exchange rates, trade patterns (imports and exports)
and country-specific conditions. Furthermore, several economists claim that a close link
exists between the relative market size in a country, the relative wealth in a host country
or the relative labour costs. And finally, the behaviour of foreign multi-national
corporations seeking to avoid uncertainty is a source of fluctuating FDI patterns,
especially in case of changes in trade barriers. FDI’s are often seen as promising new
economic opportunities in lagging regions, and sometimes even regarded as ‘manna from
heaven’. The actual achievements of regional development goals are thus far not
excessively high and some caveats are in order here. In addition, the empirical evidence in
terms of cross-national or cross-regional comparative studies is very fragmented and does
not offer a simple and promising picture.
Despite a whole range of location-specific advantages, particularly cost
advantages, empirical research has pointed to access to consumer markets as the prime
motivation for FDI and Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990’s. It needs to be
realized that market-related motivation is connected with two different corporate
strategies with different outcomes for local economic development and integration of the
host country. One is capturing an additional new market in Central and Eastern Europe by
investing in domestic industry, and the other is crowding out or transforming domestic
industries in order to prevent them to compete in Western European markets.
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Despite above advantages, there are many barriers to FDI as apparent from actual
and potential investors in Central and Eastern Europe. These barriers can be classified into
nine categories. The actual combination of barriers is of course different for each country
and for each investment project:
Political risks. These include major shifts in power and potential refusal to
acknowledge former administration’s decisions, and rapid shifts of key persons in
negotiations, all leading to uncertainty and delay.
Legal risks. There is often no solid legal system based on a free market economy.
This situation enables sudden (unexpected) modifications in rules and laws, and their
interpretation. Legal risks are concerned with property rights, validity of legal
contracts, taxes, etc.
Monetary risks. These follow from the lack of Western currency, while the domestic
currency sometimes suffers from (hyper)infIation.  As previously discussed this
situation does not apply to countries with reform based on rules from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund.
Barriers in the labour market. These include, for example, shortage of qualified
staff, mostly in management, information technology, and marketing.
Socio-cultural barriers. These include not only different languages and cultural
values, but also different ‘ways of thinking and doing things’. Further, there is often a
lack of transparency of legal and fiscal systems (procedures) for outsiders, leading to
time-consuming action in order to obtain specific approvals and detailed insights.
Information barriers. These barriers are mostly concerned with finding suitable
business partners. There is also a shortage of planning data including data on the
consumer market in Central and Eastern Europe.
Safety barriers. These are concerned with activities of maffra-like groups affecting
established companies in particular cities and transports crossing particular regions.
Barriers in infrastructure. This concerns the poor quality level of information and
telecommunication infrastructures. Underlying problems are unreliable electricity
supply and poor networks within and between cities. Further barriers are concerned
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with the road system, such as small capacity, poor level of maintenance, missing links,
and congestion at border crossings.
l Barriers in distribution and logistics. These barriers are related with the previous
ones, but there is also a strong organizational  component involved, particularly
regarding efficiency.
The above classification mirrors a combination of location-specific barriers and
lack of familiarity and information. It needs to be realized that barriers may not hold
equally good for small enterprises and multinational organisation, the latter being better
endowed with information and resources to bear risks. In addition, it should be noted that
barriers may disappear over time, such as concerning telecommunication where new
infrastructure is currently under construction (Hungary and Latvia). On the other hand,
new barriers may emerge when the recipient countries themselves protect some of their
industries from being taken over, when they expect no benefit from the type of FDI at
hand.
With more than 11 billion US$ the stock of foreign investment is presently largest
in Hungary. The Czech Republic is second, with the Russian Federation and Poland as
third and fourth. FDI in Central and Eastern Europe has increased tremendously in the
recent past. This holds particularly for Hungary, witness a rise of the stock of FDI of over
8000 million US$ between 1992 and 1995. A large increase can also be observed in the
Czech Republic and Poland in these years, witness an increase of over 4400 and almost
3700 USS,  respectively. Most recently, the Czech Republic is ‘running up’ with an equally
large increase of stock as Hungary over 1994 and 1995. It can be concluded that FDI in
Central and Eastern Europe is heavily concentrated in countries bordering the EU,
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland account for 65% of all FDI stock. This strong
concentration is underlined by the per capita distribution, albeit that Slovenia and Estonia
join Hungary and the Czech Republic in the top, whereas Poland and the Russian
Federation are behind.
The above spatial concentration of FDI seems to reflect the factor of familiarity
(information), connected with cultural ties based upon geographical proximity. It also
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reflects the influence of geographical proximity in itself However, the pattern does not
conform access to markets as the major motive for FDI, because the home market of two
of the four major recipient countries - Hungary and the Czech Republic - is rather small.
This indicates that other factors are at play. One such factor is the privatisation process.
Many countries permit foreign participation in this process under certain restrictions, but
countries like Hungary and Estonia have made it the comer-stone of their privatisation
strategies. Further, agglomeration effects may have played a role. Such effects are based
on the sharing of supporting facilities, infrastructure and pool of skilled labour provided by
an existing cluster of foreign firms, and the concomitant lower entry costs for new
projects. This would suggest that FDI in particular locations (often the capital city) in a
country may rise quickly once a certain threshold of agglomeration has been surpassed.
As previously indicated, foreign investment is also unequally spread over the
various regions within transitional economies. Large urban centres with international
airports, modern telecommunication facilities and good living conditions, and the regions
bordering Germany and Austria are most preferred. Thus, the further to the East, the less
foreign capital invested. For example, the Austrian-Slovenian border zone (Hungary) and
the region of Bratislava (Slovakia) attract more than proportionally FDI. A dominance of
FDI in large cities and in regions near the Western borders is also evident in the Russian
Federation. The largest concentration is the North West regions (St. Petersburg and
Kaliningrad province), and the North region with a high innovation potential (formerly
closed military towns) and large natural resources. It goes without saying that in these
Central- and East-European regions still many fluctuating FDI patterns may be expected.
7. Retrospect
The scene of regional policy has shown remarkable changes in the past years.
Market forces have become a respected ingredient of regional policy, but it has not led to
a disappearance of regional policy. Instead, the focus has been directed much more
rigorously than in the past on the essence of regional policy, viz. the creation of new
seedbed  conditions which would make the region more competitive. Especially three focal
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points have come to the fore in recent years, viz. infrastructure, technology and the
environment. This re-orientation has led to a shift in - but not to a decline of intensity of -
regional policy in most European countries.
A policy trend toward devolution does by no means imply that there is no case for
regional policy, but its scope has changed. A free market orientation runs the risk of
increasing regional discrepancies. Without directly interfering at the sectoral or firm level,
it is important to make the system of regions as competitive as possible, by providing all
regions with sufficient access to national-international markets by means of
transportation-communication infrastructure and information about (or incentives for) new
technology. Besides, economic restructuring may incorporate various types of external
costs (e.g., environmental decay, diseconomies of scale etc.) and policies should then be
addressed toward enhancing environmental quality and ensuring an ecologically
sustainable regional economic development. In this respect, neo-Pigovian views on
economic policy are to be linked to neo-Schumpeterian views on (regional) economic
evolution and neo-Vemonian views on the incubation conditions of cities and regions. It
seems that regional policy will move to a stage of maturity around the turn of the century.
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